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Abstract 
Smart City infrastructures require contracts between 
public and private organizations collaborating in what 
is frequently referred to as fog computing platforms. 
We investigate contract provision variations from 
different stakeholder perspectives.  Our methodology 
relies on complex adaptive systems theory, and we 
simulate different contract provision scenarios to 
identify patterns that emerge. The specific contract 
provisions we investigate in this paper are related to 
analytical model and data ownership paradigm 
variations.  We find that some variations offer 
advantages to stakeholders that include those who 
participate in the smart city fog platform and those 
who may have ownership of smart city fog platform 
infrastructure. 
 
1. Introduction  
 
Fog computing is a highly virtualized platform that 
provides compute, storage and networking services 
between end devices and traditional cloud computing 
data centers. [1] The fog is envisioned to provide a 
number of extensions to the cloud paradigm including: 
1) The fog targets the large scale distribution of data, 
analytics and smart devices connected through a 
network with rich services located at endpoints, 2) 
Endpoints are assumed to be a large number of 
geographically dispersed, mainly wireless devices that 
engage in real-time interactions and 3) Fog 
applications of analytics and big data require collectors 
at the edge to gather data (e.g., from mobile devices), 
provide semi-permanent storage facilities, deploy 
analytical models, and they have links to a cloud 
computing infrastructure where longer term storage, 
platform-level management and data mining can be 
efficiently performed.  
Fog computing is a natural space for Internet of 
Things (IoT) applications. By bridging IoT and the 
cloud, fog computing takes on the tasks and roles for 
which cloud computing has not typically been 
deployed. For example, proprietary devices such as 
those common to Smart City applications don’t 
normally exist in cloud infrastructure, but niche 
players in IoT for Smart City applications are 
envisioned as serving a major role in the fog. There 
are a variety of definitions for the phrase ‘Smart 
City,’ but they almost always include some reference 
to IoT. Most definitions center on increasing 
urbanization, the types of problems and issues that 
arise in the dynamic of large population centers and 
the realization that such places can have serious 
problems in areas like traffic congestion, healthcare 
delivery, sustainability, deteriorating infrastructure, 
etc. [2]. For example, Ojo, Curry, et al. [3] find: 
1. Smart City programs generally leverage physical 
infrastructure, information communication 
technologies, knowledge resources and social 
infrastructure to address economic regeneration, 
greater social cohesion, better city administration 
and improved infrastructure management, and 
2. Smart City initiatives typically involve an 
interplay of technology, policy and 
organizational innovation that is shaped by and 
impact external factors like people, communities, 
the economy, built infrastructure, the natural 
environment and governance. 
Several Smart City programs are ongoing in 
countries including Portugal, Brazil, United Arab 
Emirates, Korea, Japan, the USA and many others. 
Most are considering or have addressed Open Data as 
a Smart City initiative. Open Data is data that can be 
freely used, shared and built-on by anyone, 
anywhere, for any purpose. [4] For example, the 
Open Data Institute is centered on the mantra that, 
“An Open Data culture creates better cities for 
everyone.” [5] In contrast, some view self-interest as 
a key reason for the importance of encouraging 
business ownership in many contexts including Smart 
Cities; business owners have a significant vested 
interest in ensuring a system is successful [6]. There 
is an important tension related to whether Open Data 
or a more traditional data ownership paradigm will 
foster more innovation in Smart Cities [e.g., 7]. Many 
tout Open Data as a means to stimulate entrepreneurs, 
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programmers, sustainability, transportation and 
healthcare experts, data scientists and others to identify 
solutions to urban issues. Open Data improves 
transparency, accountability and it encourages citizen 
participation. On the other hand, there can be issues if 
data is not well understood, managed improperly 
and/or used inappropriately in designing and deploying 
advanced analytics. Similarly, there are issues of 
security and privacy in Open Data Smart City contexts. 
Finally, Smart City innovations in complex verticals 
are seen as more likely to be motivated through 
proprietary structures, e.g., innovations in the traffic 
engineering and healthcare delivery disciplines will 
likely occur separately and under different ownership 
structures. 
Many believe that a hybrid, parastatal model is 
applicable to managing fog computing platforms in 
Smart Cities. A parastatal is an entity that is owned 
wholly or partially by a government.  Urbanization, 
infrastructure, and technology are aligned in smart 
cities, and a variety of parastatals have emerged [e.g., 
8] 
1. Songdo International Business District in South 
Korea is chartered by the municipality of Incheon, 
but the largest shareholder is an American 
commercial developer 
2. The Skolkovo district of Russia is entirely 
government owned 
3. The Delhi Mumbai Industrial Corridor includes 8 
smart cities and is funded through a public-private 
partnership model 
Because fog computing platforms for Smart Cities 
are and will likely continue to include the hybrid 
model, there is increasing need for legal instruments to 
foster partnerships among business, government and 
parastatal entities in order to achieve innovation [9]. 
The remainder of this paper deals with contracting 
issues in this business-to-business-to-government 
(B2B2G) context.  First, we examine contract theory 
with an eye towards Smart City services that leverage 
data and analytics in deployments on fog computing 
platforms that are linked to cloud computing 
environments. We define the major issues that 
contracts need to address in this context. We then 
discuss our methodology and an example experiment. 
Through multiple experiments, we found important 
results intended to guide contract decision making 
from different stakeholders’ perspectives. We conclude 
with a discussion of needed future work.    
 
2. Nature of B2B2G Contracting for Smart 
City Fog Computing Platforms 
 
   There are four paradigms for fog computing 
platforms designed to deliver Smart City services:  1) 
Enabler, 2) Neutral, 3) System Integrator and 4) 
Broker. Walravens and Ballon differentiate the four 
on the basis of whether a single entity controls the 
assets in the platform and whether that entity has 
control over the customer relationships [10]. In this 
context, we can consider the owner as a government 
or a parastatal.  An enabler platform is one where the 
owner controls the assets but does not have control 
over the customers. The neutral platform is one 
where the owner is heavily dependent on the assets of 
the other actors to achieve Smart City ideals and does 
not control the customer relationship. The system 
integrator platform is one where the owner controls 
many of the assets, the owner establishes a 
relationship with end-users, and external, third-party 
service provider engagement is encouraged.  In the 
broker platform, the owner is dependent on the assets 
of others but doesn’t control the customer 
relationship. These paradigms can be extended by 
considering the data assets that are created when a 
Smart City fog computing platform executes, and 
considerable data ingestion at service delivery 
endpoints ensues. When data is ingested, its 
ownership rights can inherit properties from the 
paradigm under which the platform is organized. For 
example, in the neutral platform, the data ingested 
might be owned by the third-party partner who also 
owns the relationship with the customer. Private 
parties may have proprietary rights to the data 
collected as part of their engagement in the fog 
platform. Similarly, in the broker platform, the data 
ingested at endpoints delivering services that are 
under control of the owner may also be the property 
of a third-party, but the owner may have to negotiate 
and enter into a broker contract for data ownership 
rights since external data and infrastructure provided 
by a third party enables the service. In these and 
many other Smart City scenarios, there are complex 
issues of data ownership that need to be reconciled 
through contracts. 
In addition to data ownership contract 
considerations, the analytical models that can be 
created through data mining can also be subject to 
negotiated ownership rights, and this process is 
similarly complex.  For example, a predictive model 
that is derived from data that is co-owned may inherit 
ownership rights from the data co-ownership contract 
agreement.  Consider also that a predictive model 
deployed to deliver a personalized service at an 
endpoint that, when executed, may well result in 
additional data ingestion.  This newly ingested data 
can be thought of as being influenced by a predictive 
model that is co-owned, so should that subsequently 
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ingested data be similarly co-owned by the predictive 
model owners?  In general, data and analytics 
ownership should be contracted for separately, but 
their ownership can be intertwined.  It is important for 
data and analytics contracts for Smart City fog 
platforms to take this complexity into account when 
detailing contract terms.   However, it not always 
possible to envision any and all possibilities for a 
Smart City initiative, so contracts aren’t often all-
encompassing. 
Grossman and Hart and Hart and Moore define 
ownership as the, “residual right to control access to an 
asset.” [11, 12]  In using the term residual, this 
definition implies that some rights can be assigned to 
others using what is referred to as an incomplete 
contract.  The rights not assigned are residual rights in 
the Grossman and Hart and Hart and Moore approach.  
The reason that a contract might be incomplete is that 
its clauses, provisions, conditions and terms may not 
cover all actions and payments for every possible 
contingency that might arise.   In the theory of 
incomplete contracts, there is an important concern 
called the hold-up problem.  This problem occurs when 
parties must make non-contractible relationship-
specific investments before a transaction takes place.  
For example, building a Smart City fog computing 
platform might require third-party investment in 
infrastructure assets before any services can be 
deployed and revenue can be realized.  The hold-up 
problem manifests in the fact that the third-party 
underinvests because the return may be greater if there 
can be renegotiation at a later time – e.g., the third-
party sees the situation as a multi-stage game whereby 
more value may be extracted by a later renegotiation.  
Incomplete contract theory stipulates mechanisms for 
mitigating the hold-up problem.  A basic solution is to 
make a contract as complete as possible and to limit 
renegotiation at a later date.  To this end, we have 
developed a Smart City services system model that 
aids in articulating terms for Smart City contracts.  Our 
focus is on the data and analytics ownership issues.  
 
3. A Smart City Multitenant System Model 
 
A Smart City fog computing infrastructure linked to 
a cloud computing environment needs to be capable of 
integrating multiple initiatives simultaneously.  This is 
consistent with a multitenant architectural approach.  
(Note:  Some Smart City infrastructures may be multi-
instance; our focus is on multitenant environments.)  
For example, there may be traffic applications and 
healthcare applications deployed concomitantly.  
Therefore, a Smart City platform owner needs to 
configure infrastructure for different initiatives in order 
to make optimal use of resources.  In this way, there 
is support for initiatives that come and go, there are 
ways to support solution refinement and 
redeployment, new initiatives can built on top of 
successful predecessors and some initiatives might 
provide more value than others in delivering the same 
service so some die while others are scaled up.  The 
swapping in and out of instances of Smart City 
services needs to be efficient, and the overall 
management of the platform requires a global 
management viewpoint for the owner(s).   
We consider a Smart City service initiative as 
involving three major abstractions:  1) A set of Hosts: 
H = {H1, H2, ... Hp}, 2) A set of Smart Object Hosts: 
SOH = {SOH1, SOH2, ... SOHq}, and 3) A set of 
Smart Objects: SOSOHi = {SOSOHi,1, SOSOHi,2, … 
SOSOHi,m}.  Smart Objects are located at endpoints 
where services are delivered and data is optionally 
digested. Smart Objects are associated with a sensor 
cluster owner or hub, i.e., a Smart Object Host.  For 
each Smart Object, we assume it has a set of Senses: 
S = {SSOi,1, SSOi,2, ... SSOi,n}.  A sense can be a 
capability to ingest a data item (e.g., decibel level, 
temperature, etc.) and/or it can be an output 
capability (e.g., a noise, a coupon, a text message, 
etc.).  Note that we refer to the endpoints as smart to 
imply they are capable of short-term data storage and 
they can execute an analytical model that may take 
sense values as inputs and produce sense values as 
outputs.  We consider an analytical model (or simply 
an analytic) as being deployed by a Host through a 
Smart Object Host to a Smart Object.  We describe 
an analytic as a function of a subset of the senses that 
a Smart Object is capable of, and the output of the 
model is also a sense that a Smart Object is capable 
of. In short, there can be a set of Analytical Models 
(AM) deployed by some Smart Object Host, SOHj at 
the direction of a Host Hi or a Smart Object Host, 
SOHj to some Smart Object, SOSOHj,q, such that 
AM(f(Subset(SOSOHj,q,Sa, SOSOHj,q,Sb, ... SOSOHj,q,St))  
-> (Subset(SOSOHj,q,Sa, SOSOHj,q,Sb, ... SOSOHj,q,St)). 
A brief example can help to clarify the notations 
and the intent of the Smart City initiative service 
system model.  Consider an Intel AIM Suite® video 
sign kiosk that can display a video while at the same 
time it can monitor the demographics of those who 
are watching the video [13].  Let’s assume that the 
video signage kiosk is located just outside all store 
entrances in a particular district of a smart city.  
Further, assume that a district’s single proprietor has 
purchased the video signage kiosks as a perk for 
stores that rent space in the district.  Now, the Smart 
Object Host can be thought of as the district 
proprietor.  The video sign kiosks can be thought of 
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as Smart Objects.  The store owners may be thought of 
as the Hosts.  
To put the service system into motion (Figure 1), 
consider that the video sign kiosk can display videos 
from suppliers to the store that help to advertise the 
products the store is selling.  We can therefore also 
consider the suppliers as Hosts.  When the district’s 
stores are open and people walk around, a kiosk may 
be displaying a video and capturing demographics of a 
person who is watching intently.  That kiosk has 
analytical models that enable examining the skull and 
body structure of a viewer to determine gender, age 
range, the viewing time and the distance from the 
kiosk.  Further, suppose the kiosk can deploy analytical 
models sent to it by the stores.  For example, Macy’s 
may opt for the kiosk to send a coupon in a text 
message to a viewer who has watched a certain video 
for a certain length of time.  Similarly, a supplier may 
have an analytical model at the kiosk that extends an 
up-sell offer for a viewer who showed interest in a 
swim suit ad that provides incentives to purchase a 
matching cover-up.   When data is ingested at the 
kiosk, the analytical models use their senses to evaluate 
if the model is relevant, and if so, the kiosk’s other 
senses enable it to send a text message (if permitted by 
the viewer).  The data in the overall system includes 
the demographics of the viewer, the time spent 
watching the video, the state of how many kiosks had 
active viewers at a point in time in the district, the 
demographics of those issued texted coupons, whether 
a purchase was made with the coupon, etc.  To further 
complicate matters, the store owners may be collecting 
data on sales to determine the most effective campaign 
models, so it can do data mining to build a new 
analytical model for deployment to relevant kiosks. 
 
ü  A	Host	sends	an	Analy-cal	Model	to	a	Smart	Object	Host,	and	the	Smart	Object	Host	
deploys	it	to	a	Smart	Object	(at	the	edge)	
ü  The	Smart	Object	is	always	on,	gathers	data	through	its	senses	and	if	the	analy-cal	
model	is	applied	based	on	the	data	collected,	the	Smart	Object	does	as	the	model	
dictates	by	responding	through	its	senses			
ü  Data	items	are	con-nuously	generated	and	collected	by	the	Smart	Objects			
ü  A	Host	can	query	a	Smart	Object	for	data	and	use	that	data	to	construct	a	new	
Analy-cal	Model*	that	is	deployed	through	a	Smart	Object	Host	to	a	Smart	Object	
ü  Similarly,	a	Smart	Object	Host	can	query	a	smart	object	for	data	and	use	that	data	to	
construct	a	new	Analy-cal	Model**	that	is	deployed	through	a	Smart	Object	Host	(or	
itself)	to	a	Smart	Object	
	
H																				AM																SOH												SO										Applies	AM	
	
	 	 	 	 	 		AM*															H												Data	Item	
	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 			AM**										SOH	
 
Figure 1:  Sample dynamic flow 
 
What’s clear from the example above is that it can 
get extremely complex very quickly regarding what 
entities own which data and analytical models.  This 
example is rich in the sense that there are multiple 
participants, data ownership is open to contract 
negotiation between the parties, and the dynamics of 
the service system require consideration of a variety 
of scenarios and extended possibilities when deciding 
on contract terms.  In fact, Federal Trade 
Commission Chairwoman Edith Rameriz cited Intel’s 
AIM Suite as indicative of the privacy and security 
concerns for Smart City fog platforms. [14]  In 
relation to the responsibility for privacy and security, 
there are many questions in terms of this scenario 
about ownership such as: 
1. Who owns the demographic data collected at the 
kiosk – the district proprietor, the store, the 
supplier who provided the video? All of the 
parties? 
2. How should ingested data co-ownership be 
determined?  For example, should store owners 
be required to allow others to co-own data on the 
number of purchases (and dollar values) that 
resulted from the issuance of a coupon? 
3. Who owns the predictive models that are 
constructed from data that might be co-owned? 
4. Who owns the data that is collected after an 
analytical model is deployed that might impact 
the behavior of the service system as a whole? 
5. If a store owner closes up, how will ownership 
structure be impacted? 
Natural extensions to the system model include the 
situation where more than one Host is contracting 
with a single Smart Object Host, Smart Objects are 
co-owned, owned data by a party who exits should be 
deleted (or is allowed to persist if co-owned), etc.  In 
the following section, the issues related to contract 
terms are summarized with respect to the Smart City 
multitenant system model and the example scenario 
above.   
 
4. Data and Analytics Ownership 
Contract Provision Options 
 
Contract provisions addressing ownership and 
other related characteristics can potentially influence 
the design and operations of Smart City fog 
platforms. In the following, we discuss six contract 
provision options.  Several options pertain to contract 
provisions involving data and analytical model 
ownership. 
Fixed-price vs. Value-based contracts:  In fixed-
based contracts, the parties agree on some unit of 
analysis upon which service fees will be assessed.  
For example, the messaging between H and SOH 
may be billed on a per-message basis or on the basis 
of the time duration of a contract.  In contrast, value-
based contracts refer to a division between the parties 
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of, for example, the total profit generated by partnering 
stakeholders.  For example, if there is a profit from a 
partnership of H and SOH stakeholders in a Smart City 
fog platform, then contract provisions will specify how 
the profit is to be divided between stakeholders. 
Data Exclusivity vs. Non-Exclusivity:  When data 
ownership is exclusive, there is a specific entity that 
owns the data.  For example, a contract may stipulate 
that an SOH owns all the data generated by the SOs 
connected to it.  Data is co-owned or open when 
contract provisions stipulate that data is non-exclusive. 
Analytical Model Exclusivity vs. Non-Exclusivity:  
An analytical model is owned by the entity responsible 
for its creation if an exclusivity provision is included in 
a contract.  In addition, only the creator of the analytic 
is allowed to modify it.  When an AM is non-
exclusive, then it is co-owned or open.  Any of the co-
owners can modify the analytic. 
Co-mingling vs. No Co-mingling:  In co-mingling, 
an analytical model created or derived through data 
that is co-owned is thereby co-owned by the same 
entities who co-own the data.  If there is no co-
mingling, the entity that creates the model owns the 
model exclusively. 
Data post-use vs. No data post-use:  If data post-use 
is a contract provision, then if a data owner leaves a 
partnership governed by a contract, the data that entity 
owns becomes the property of the remaining owner(s).  
If there is no data post-use contract clause, the data 
solely owned by an exiting owner is deleted. 
Analytical model post-use vs. No analytical model 
post-use:  If an analytical model post-use provision is 
included in a contract, then an analytical model 
owned/co-owned by a exiting partner remains the 
property of the remaining owner(s).  If there is no 
analytical model post-use, then an analytical model 
solely owned by an exiting owner is deleted. 
Note that the contract provisions above may all exist 
at the same time in Smart City fog platform contracts. 
In the course of the life of such a fog platform, 
contracts will change between parties, parties 
themselves may come and go, and data and analytical 
models may constantly evolve. 
 
5.  Methodology 
 
   We view an instance of a multitenant smart city fog 
platform with a set of participating organizations and a 
platform owner(s) as a complex system.  Such a system 
exhibits dynamism in the sense that new participants 
may join over time, some participants leave, 
participants can enter into contracts with each other 
and then dynamically change the provisions of those 
contracts, and new IoT hardware and software can be 
deployed and/or removed.  All of these changes can 
occur quickly, simultaneously and in isolation of 
other changes that may be taking place in the 
platform.  For these types of systems, a research 
methodology relying on complex adaptive system 
theory has been found relevant [e.g., 15, 16].  Given 
the dynamics of smart city fog platforms, it follows 
that there is no single governing equation or rule that 
controls the system.  Instead, there are many 
interacting parts with little central control.  There is 
an unpredictable future trajectory of a multitenant fog 
computing platform given the nonlinear variety of 
changes and evolutions it may go through.  The fog 
platform changes and adapts in accordance with 
changes that occur from one snapshot to the next.  It 
is akin to a moving target with continuously changing 
equilibrium states. 
   Using a complex adaptive systems research 
methodology typically requires construction of a 
system simulator that allows the researcher to 
conduct experiments by manipulating control 
variables, observing behavior and modifying 
variables to derive new conclusions.  While it may be 
straightforward to define the rules of behavior for 
participants in a complex system, it is not obvious 
what patterns might emerge when individual 
participants follow those rules over time.  Thus as a 
complex system adapts, patterns may or may not 
emerge that provide evidence of the holistic behavior 
of the system. 
   In the case of data and analytics ownership 
contracts, a complex adaptive systems methodology 
will necessarily involve experimentation,  
observation of emerging patterns, variable 
manipulation and additional experimentation.  The 
following section describes an example experiment. 
   
6. Example Experiment 
 
Consistent with the complex adaptive systems 
methodology, we constructed a simulator that 
elaborates the fog platform abstractions of Section 
3’s Smart City system model.  The simulator supports 
experimental observance of fog platform executions 
by facilitating manipulations of a large number of 
variables. It also supports the establishment of 
different sets of dependent and independent variables.  
For example, the simulator supports varying the 
topologies created for a specific Smart City initiative 
abstraction.  Topology can described in terms of the 
Hosts (H), Smart Object Hosts (SOH) and Smart 
Objects (SO).  A particular topology might start with 
a stochastically generated number (within a given 
distribution) of H, SOH and SO entities.  Each 
topology forms a graph with edges connecting 
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different H entities with SOH entities to indicate there 
is a contract for engaging in a Smart City initiative.  
SO entities are connected to SOH entities to indicate an 
ownership relationship, i.e., an SOH owns an SO.  A 
topology usually has a larger number of smart objects 
(SO) than it has smart object hosts (SOH).  For 
example, there may be many stores (following the Intel 
AIM Suite scenario, above) – or many Hs.  There may 
be one district proprietor (SOH) who purchased all of 
the kiosks (SOs) to place throughout the district.  Since 
there are kiosks (SOs) at each store in the district, the 
topology is a graph connecting H to SOH and SOH to 
each of the SOs.  Note that if the number of SOs is 
larger than the number of SOHs, then the topology 
indicates that there are many owners for each SO.   
Other variables include the number of scripts that are 
executed in a single simulator run, and there is a 
variable for managing the total number of simulator 
runs for a particular experiment.  Actions in a script 
might include adding or deleting hosts (Hs), adding or 
deleting smart object hosts (SOHs), adding or deleting 
smart objects (SOs), adding or deleting analytical 
models (AMs), etc.  Scripts are simulations of events 
that occur in the Smart City service system, and they 
are serially executed primitive operations within the 
simulator.  Scripts have actions that are stochastically 
determined.  In the experiment described below, many 
of the independent variables are manipulated while two 
dependent variables are observed:  in-fog 
communication cost and fog-to-cloud communication 
cost.  Table One lists the variables included in the 
current version of the simulator. 
 
Topology (Number of H, SOH an SO entities and the 
contract/ownership links between them) 
In-fog messaging and data access costs 
Fog-to-Cloud messaging and data access costs 
Number of scripts executed per simulator run 
Count of topology simulations for a given topology in a run 
Number of Hs added or deleted in a run (add and delete scripts are 
randomly generated according to a given distribution) 
Number of SOHs added or deleted in a run (add or delete scripts 
are randomly generated in a run according to a given distribution) 
Number of SOs added or deleted in a run (add or delete scripts are 
randomly generated in a run according to a given distribution)  
Number of Analytical Models (AMs) added, deleted or updated in 
run 
Contract Type:  Fixed (flat fees for a level of service) vs. Value 
(parties share in value that the relationship generates) 
Table One:  Simulator variables 
 
The main benefit of the simulator is that it can be 
configured to examine a particular contract type.  For 
example, selecting from the provision options in 
Section 4, above yields a contract instance.  At this 
point, the simulator is constructed such that all of the 
dyads in a particular topology agree to the same 
contract (e.g., all H and SOH entities in a topology 
agree to a common set of contract provisions).  In 
other words, all H to SOH contract provisions are 
fixed for a run.  A run means the simulator will: 
REPEAT  1) Generate a topology, 2) REPEAT 3) 
Generate a script, 4) Serially execute the script and 
accumulate the in-fog communication costs and the 
fog-to-cloud communication costs (currently counted 
as a cost of 1 per link followed in the topology), 
UNTIL the required number of scripts are generated, 
UNTIL the number of topologies generated are 
robust enough to draw general conclusions from the 
run.  
In-fog communication costs are those related to 
sending messages from SOH to SO (and vice-versa) 
to reflect the actions required in executing a script.  
In contrast, H to SOH communications are from the 
cloud (where the datacenters belonging to each H are 
presumed to exist) to SOHs and from SOHs (in the 
fog) to Hs (in the cloud), i.e., cloud-to-fog and fog-
to-cloud – we refer to both cases as fog-to-cloud) to 
reflect the actions required in executing a script.  We 
modeled the databases stored at Hs, SOHs and SOs – 
and the database model remains consistent across 
cases investigated in the following experiment.   
In this experiment, we considered two specific sets 
of contract provisions consistent with the discussion 
in Section 1, above, regarding tensions between open 
and more proprietary Smart City services’ fog 
computing platform initiatives.  We assume the 
context is one where all parties are entered into the 
same fixed-based contracts for each case examined 
using the simulator. 
Case 1:  The first case we investigate assumes 
analytical model exclusivity, open data, no co-
mingling, no analytical model post-use.  Basically, 
this context is one where the ideals of open data 
proponents enable entrepreneurs to create new 
services (via proprietary analytical models) that will 
generate revenue for innovators, but where all data 
remains open - yet upon exit, an entrepreneurial 
partner can remove owned analytical models from the 
fog computing platform. 
Case 2:  The second case we investigate assumes 
analytical model non-exclusivity, open data, co-
mingling, and analytical model post-use.  In this 
scenario, there is an even more open environment 
assumption since analytical models have shared 
ownership and all data is open. 
To examine differences using the simulator, we 
established distributions for generating random 
topologies.  Basically, we used the same distributions 
for Hs and SOHs, but we increased the size of the SO 
distributions to reflect that there will likely be many 
sensors associated with a Smart City initiative: 
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H/SOH Distributions SO Distributions 
Low:  5 to 50  Low:  10 to 100 
Medium: 51 to 200 Medium:101 to 500 
High: 201 to 500  High:  501 to 1000 
 
  We refer to the topologies generated in the following 
by using a three letter acronym associated with 
abbreviations of Low, Medium and High.  For 
example, the abbreviation LLL implies a topology 
where the number of Hs is low, the number of SOHs is 
low and the number of SOs is low.  In this way, we 
ensured we could observe that a simulator run 
produced sufficient observations for each topology for 
a varying number of scripts.  We varied the number of 
scripts in a similar low, medium and high manner.  The 
low number of scripts is 20, the medium is 50 and the 
high is 100.  The intent is to use the simulator to 
examine a robust mix of scripts as well as a robust set 
of topologies.  
For Case 1 with 100 scripts, Table 2 shows the 
results of the simulator.  Note that in Case 1, there are 
considerably more in-fog costs than fog-to-cloud costs 
for all topologies.  This finding was consistent across 
the 20 and 50 script size runs. Table 3 shows 
information about the variables we sought to keep 
consistent across all runs and script executions in order 
to isolate the in-fog and fog-to-cloud cost variations 
only.  The small standard deviations of the means 
across runs are indicative that these variables were kept 
within suitable range. 
 
Topology In-Fog Costs Fog-to-Cloud Costs Count
LLL 1,418,901,602.00 1,322,350.38 293
LLM 1,538,680,994.00 1,432,207.60 266
LLH 1,614,220,422.00 1,502,766.21 225
LML 1,470,203,498.00 1,368,115.69 236
LMM 1,582,192,066.00 1,472,875.60 276
LMH 1,613,721,673.00 1,502,277.50 233
LHL 1,638,695,953.00 1,544,229.20 245
LHM 1,620,924,447.00 1,507,126.10 272
LHH 1,569,527,453.00 1,460,256.30 190
MLL 1,578,840,869.00 1,469,341.75 258
MLM 1,641,345,498.00 1,526,573.50 249
MLH 1,583,851,551.00 1,472,606.90 210
MML 1,680,872,818.00 1,563,652.80 229
MMM 1,668,962,464.00 1,552,893.90 234
MMH 1,486,440,631.00 1,383,571.07 173
MHL 1,546,653,065.00 1,440,613.29 259
MHM 1,506,906,948.00 1,401,363.67 242
MHH 1,564,982,110.00 1,456,073.47 194
HLL 1,577,668,984.00 1,468,729.05 265
HLM 1,582,113,627.00 1,472,909.88 275
HLH 1,636,453,909.00 1,522,136.13 199
HML 1,572,133,471.00 1,463,513.17 265
HMM 1,701,662,490.00 1,582,938.81 241
HMH 1,533,345,334.00 1,427,737.19 182
HHL 1,574,900,090.00 1,765,919.21 235
HHM 1,578,362,780.00 1,468,635.34 234
HHH 1,726,634,953.00 1,603,335.39 158  
Table 2:  Case 1 - 100 scripts – dependent 
variables 
 
CASE	1
Mean	Of	Mean SD	Of	Mean Mean	Of	Mean SD	Of	Mean Mean	Of	Mean SD	Of	Mean
Avg	#H	added 9,795 313 17,572 626 49,666 2,159
Avg	#H	deleted 9,779 317 17,565 629 49,961 2,170
Avg	#SOH	added 9,808 324 17,514 625 49,758 2,172
Avg	#SOH	deleted 19,519 631 34,820 1,244 98,398 4,280
Avg	#SO	deleted	 9,762 307 17,403 622 50,048 2,174
Avg	AM	added 3,224 104 5,815 209 16,694 723
Avg	AM	deleted 3,217 91 5,812 210 16,694 723
20	Scripts 50	Scripts 100	Scripts
 
Table 3: Case 1 – 100 scripts – control variables 
 
For Case 2 with 100 scripts, the results of the 
simulator are shown in Table 4.  Compared to case 1, 
the Fog-to-Cloud costs are substantially higher, but 
the in-fog costs are fairly consistent.  This appears to 
be a surprising result since Case 2 is presumably a 
more open Smart City context than Case 1 – 
analytical models are non-exclusive, data is open, 
there is no Post-use limitation.  Why would the fog to 
cloud costs be so substantially higher for a more open 
environment when contrasted with a more 
proprietary, closed environment?  Note that the 
reason isn’t due to some variation in the control 
variables for Case 2 as shown in Table 6.  The 
standard deviations are quite low. 
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Topology In-Fog Costs Fog-to-Cloud Costs Count
LLL 1,435,689,941.53 61,961,562.09 303
LLM 1,515,670,584.67 65,384,928.09 278
LLH 1,481,367,365.68 63,936,550.59 235
LML 1,480,691,085.18 63,884,041.67 256
LMM 1,579,861,442.77 68,132,964.47 249
LMH 1,494,748,210.50 64,503,463.77 242
LHL 1,575,744,830.25 67,943,358.97 280
LHM 1,477,016,530.93 63,716,149.85 260
LHH 1,472,672,706.10 63,557,916.19 185
MLL 1,447,297,831.08 62,473,617.45 264
MLM 1,508,190,762.60 65,002,924.60 258
MLH 1,482,376,442.15 63,962,473.70 232
MML 1,448,178,701.00 62,496,678.75 237
MMM 1,451,499,536.20 62,636,967.48 241
MMH 1,634,016,700.78 70,418,365.52 201
MHL 1,555,942,572.18 67,080,782.60 224
MHM 1,631,792,201.34 70,381,041.20 209
MHH 1,491,970,865.30 64,354,923.21 200
HLL 1,548,963,157.15 66,825,366.92 253
HLM 1,522,050,702.91 65,625,290.48 227
HLH 1,369,411,272.57 59,118,090.50 174
HML 1,449,491,552.14 62,542,104.78 230
HMM 1,414,640,491.44 61,042,665.31 232
HMH 1,538,028,657.29 66,301,070.94 178
HHL 1,531,807,089.06 66,090,009.35 234
HHM 1,477,779,161.17 63,756,352.70 220
HHH 1,564,282,284.76 67,447,879.74 176  
Table 4:  Case 1 - 100 scripts – dependent 
variables 
 
CASE	2
Mean	Of	Mean SD	Of	Mean Mean	Of	Mean SD	Of	Mean Mean	Of	Mean SD	Of	Mean
Avg	#H	added 8,866 386 22,470 941 45,527 1,448
Avg	#H	deleted 9,008 386 22,567 946 45,025 1,438
Avg	#SOH	added 8,790 381 22,402 942 45,086 1,448
Avg	#SOH	deleted 17,697 763 44,646 1,877 89,071 2,861
Avg	#SO	added	 8,888 388 22,506 949 45,122 1,448
Avg	#SO	deleted	 8,798 385 22,703 945 45,302 1,452
Avg	AM	added 2,963 128 7,531 316 15,049 480
Avg	AM	deleted 2,963 128 7,531 316 15,049 480
20	Scripts 50	Scripts 100	Scripts
 
Table 5:  Case 1 – 100 scripts – control variables 
 
We find that the reason Case 2 requires more fog-to-
cloud communication is because that in order to have 
non-exclusive analytical models, there is a need to 
communicate all model changes to Hosts.  In other 
words, the open environment in this experiment leads 
to a high cost for fog-to-cloud communication.  
Democratization of analytics and models comes at a 
cost.   
 
7. Overall Findings 
 
Table 6 summarizes findings from thousands of 
experiments that we conducted.  These can be viewed 
as starting points for elaborating more sophisticated 
decision models by applying actual smart city 
infrastructure cost estimates and other financial 
parameters.  For findings I - IX, the contract type 
assumption for the finding is given.  Next, the 
contract’s provision and the perspective relevant to 
the finding are stated.  Timing refers to when a 
participant may opt to enter into the smart city 
dynamic, and partnering refers to the nature of the 
relationships among stakeholders.  Finally, findings 
are shown relevant to the given scenario. 
Row I refers to the experiment discussed in section 
6 of this paper.  Here, the contract was fixed, data 
and analytics are open, and the perspective is from 
the vantage point of the smart city fog platform 
owner.  Timing doesn’t matter in this case, and the 
partnering relationship is one of open sharing.  The 
important finding here is that the platform owner will 
need an infrastructure with a larger capacity, all other 
things being equal, in contrast to an architecture 
where there contract provisions are proprietary.  
Democratization of analytics and data comes at a cost 
to the infrastructure owner.   
In Row II, taken from a  participant’s perspective, 
if the partner is an early entrant into the smart city 
infrastructure, and that participant sustains for a 
relatively long period of time, then under the data 
post-use paradigm, that participant can anticipate co-
owning a large percentage of the fog platforms 
ingested data during that time period.  In fact, the 
average across thousands of simulation runs was that 
the participant would co-own 73% of that ingested 
data. 
Row III is similar to the case of Row II, however, 
here we found that an early entrant in a data post-use 
contracting environment that partners with a another 
early entrant that operates in a complementary area 
can together co-own even more data than in the 
scenario of Row II.  In Row IV, we consider the 
scenario where there are no data post-use contract 
provisions.  In this scenario, a participant should not 
exchange any value for a post-use contract with 
another participant because the data ingested into the 
whole system will likely be fairly quickly flushed.  
The scenario of Row V. is similar – it indicates that 
trying to negotiate for data post-use in a fog platform 
instance where no other parties are sharing data post-
use is not a good option. 
In scenario VI, we consider a late entrant who may 
target a long-term, early entrant with a data sharing 
agreement, and we find the late entrant can indeed 
benefit from that relationship.  In this scenario, if the 
late entrant picks the correct partner, the averages we 
observed were that 50% of the fog platforms ingested 
data may well be shared. 
Scenario VII addresses the context where 
participants have exited in an environment 
characterized by data non-exclusivity and analytic 
post-use.  The fog platform owner will require some 
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sort of garbage collection mechanism that executes on 
a regular basis in order to avoid unnecessary 
infrastructure costs.   
In Row VIII, where there are analytics co-mingling 
and data non-exclusivity, predictive model updates can 
become an issue.  We observed highly bi-modal 
distributions in communication and coordination costs 
for predictive model updates.  In instances where 
update latency is significant, it will be very important 
to have large communication pipes. 
Finally, in Row IX, we found throughout our 
experiments that early performance results were not 
reliable; the simulation almost always took significant 
time to stabilize.  This means that fog platform owner 
should not rely too much on early system performance 
results in taking measures to improve the infrastructure 
performance. 
  
 
8. Conclusion 
 
The purpose of this research was to investigate 
organizational data and analytics contracting in smart 
city fog platforms.  We identified and considered 
different contract provisions including analytical model  
and data co-mingling/no co-mingling, post-use and no 
post-use and exclusivity/non-exclusivity.  We also 
consider fee-based and value-based contract types.  
Using complex adaptive systems methods and 
extensive experimentation, we identified emergent 
patterns that can guide stakeholders negotiating 
preferred contract positions.  Stakeholders include both 
smart city fog platform owners and participants in 
these multitenant platforms.  Our future work requires 
improving the simulator so that multiple contract types 
and provisions can be mixed in hybrid contexts rather 
than be held consistent for each experiment.  In 
addition, we plan to consider additional contract 
provisions and more real-life scenarios.  Finally, we 
plan to leverage our simulation results to construct 
analytical models that include financial/cost/revenue 
detail. 
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